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KEARNEY; MARY SATTLER; 
 
HOWARD SIROTA, 
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UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT FOR THE 
DISTRICT OF NEW JERSEY 
 
District Judge William H. Walls 
(D.C. Civ. No: 98-01664) 
 
Argued December 15, 2000 
 
Before: SCIRICA, FUENTES, and GARTH, Circuit  Judges 
 
(Opinion Filed: August 8, 2001) 
 
 
  
       Adam N. Saravay (argued) 
       Tompkins, McGuire, Wachenfeld & 
        Barry, LLP 
       Four Gateway Center 
       100 Mulberry Street 
       Newark, New Jersey 07102 
 
        Attorneys for Appellant 
 
       Judith E. Harris (argued) 
       Morgan, Lewis & Bockius, LLP 
       1701 Market Street 
       Philadelphia, Pennsylvania 19103 
 
        Amicus Curiae in support of the 
       Order of the District Court 
 
OPINION OF THE COURT 
 
FUENTES, Circuit Judge. 
 
This appeal raises important questions concerning the 
use of sealed bids in auctions conducted to select lead 
counsel in class action lawsuits. The genesis of the appeal 
lies in the District Court's selection of lead counsel in the 
Cendant "PRIDES" securities litigation based on the results 
of a competitive bidding process. The core of the dispute 
involves a confidentiality order in which the District Court 
decided to seal the bids until resolution of the case. The 
order was issued in connection with an in camera  hearing 
where plaintiffs' attorneys, but not the general public, had 
access to the bids. After learning that one of the 
unsuccessful bidding attorneys, Howard Sirota, had spoken 
to a reporter from the New York Times about the bidding 
process, the District Court fined Sirota $1,000. Sirota 
appeals the sanction. Because we conclude that the District 
Court failed to articulate the necessary findings for the 
issuance of the confidentiality order, and because we find 
that, in any case, Sirota did not violate the order, we will 
vacate the sanction.1 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
1. The Court takes this opportunity to express its appreciation to Judith 
E. Harris and the law firm of Morgan, Lewis & Bockius LLP, for arguing 
as amicus in support of the District Court's order in this case. 
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I. 
 
Some explanation of the underlying securities litigation 
provides a helpful background for the proceeding resulting 
in the sanction against Sirota. Because a full procedural 
and factual background of the Cendant litigation is set 
forth in numerous published opinions,2  we will only discuss 
the facts most relevant to the resolution of the issues 
presented in this appeal. Briefly, on April 15, 1998, 
Cendant Corporation announced that it had uncovered 
substantial accounting irregularities and would have to 
restate reported annual and quarterly earnings for 1997 
and possibly earlier; as a result, Cendant stock plummeted 
46%. Some 64 lawsuits (mostly class actions) were filed 
against Cendant, its officers and directors; all but one were 
consolidated. 
 
On May 29, 1998, a preliminary case management/ 
scheduling order established a schedule for motions to 
address the appointment of lead counsel for the class. 
Among the fifteen motions filed was one submitted by 
Sirota, together with co-counsel John J. Barry and Charles 
C. Carella, to have their clients, the Joanne A. Aboff Family 
Trust ("Aboff ") and Douglass Wilson, appointed as lead 
plaintiffs and to have themselves appointed lead counsel. 
 
After considering the motions, the District Court outlined 
a process for selecting lead plaintiff and lead counsel. First, 
the District Court applied a statutory presumption that the 
plaintiff with the largest financial interest in the litigation 
should be appointed lead plaintiff. See In re Cendant Corp. 
Litig., 182 F.R.D. 144, 146-47 (D.N.J. 1998) (citing 15 
U.S.C. S 77z-1(a)(3)(B)). Because of a possible conflict of 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
2. The District Court has authored several opinions. See, e.g., In re 
Cendant Corp. Litig., 182 F.R.D. 144 (D.N.J. 1998); In re Cendant Corp. 
Prides Litig., 51 F. Supp. 2d 537 (D.N.J. 1999), vacated in part, 243 F.3d 
722 (3d Cir. 2001); In re Cendant Corp. Prides Litig., 189 F.R.D. 321 
(D.N.J. 1999), aff 'd, 233 F.3d 188 (3d Cir. 2000). The Cendant cases 
have also spawned a number of appeals to our Court. See, e.g., In re 
Cendant Corp. PRIDES Litig., 243 F.3d 722 (3d Cir. 2001); In re Cendant 
Corp. PRIDES Litig., 235 F.3d 176 (3d Cir. 2000); In re Cendant Corp. 
PRIDES Litig., 234 F.3d 166 (3d Cir. 2000); In re Cendant Corp. Prides 
Litig., 233 F.3d 188 (3d Cir. 2000). 
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interest, the District Court determined that a separate lead 
plaintiff would be appointed to pursue claims involving 
Income and Growth Prides ("PRIDES"), derivative securities 
based on Cendant common stock.3See id. at 149-50. 
Neither Aboff nor Wilson was selected as a lead plaintiff. 
 
Second, in selecting lead counsel, the District Court 
adopted a competitive bidding system, reasoning that"the 
most effective way to establish reasonable attorney fees is 
through marketplace . . . competition." Id.  at 150. The 
District Court therefore ordered "an auction to determine 
the lowest qualified bidder to represent the class as 
counsel." Id. at 151. To be considered, plaintiffs' attorneys 
were required to submit bids under seal, stating, among 
other things, their professional qualifications and the fee 
arrangement that would be acceptable to them should they 
be selected as lead counsel. The record as of this date 
reveals that all bids remain under seal. 
 
On October 2, 1998, the District Court selected separate 
lead counsel for the non-PRIDES claims and for the 
PRIDES claims; Sirota and his co-counsel were not 
selected. In choosing lead counsel, the District Court 
stressed the need for confidentiality. Following an in camera 
hearing, attended only by applicants for the two lead 
counsel positions, i.e., plaintiffs' attorneys, the court 
distributed an opinion containing a confidentiality order. 
The court ordered the identities of the bidders and the 
nature of their proposals sealed until the conclusion of the 
case, referring to the proposals only by number and 
explaining: 
 
       It is of utmost concern to the Court that this opinion, 
       the bidders' identities and the contents of their bids be 
       sealed until resolution of this matter. This is done to 
       maintain adversarial integrity, that of strategy and 
       tactics, which is the prerogative of all parties, plaintiffs 
       and defendants. 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
3. The non-PRIDES claims included those of former shareholders of CUC 
International and HFS, Inc., companies which merged to form Cendant, 
as well as the claims of purchasers of Cendant stock. See Cendant, 182 
F.R.D. at 146. 
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In re Cendant Corp. Litig., 191 F.R.D. 387, 387 (D.N.J. 
1998) (opinion selecting lead counsel). As a result of the in 
camera hearing and the confidentiality order, plaintiffs' 
attorneys, but not the general public, had access to each 
others' bids. 
 
Thereafter, on November 30, 1998, the District Court 
separated the PRIDES claims from the rest of the Cendant 
case. In an order entered on March 18, 1999, the District 
Court preliminarily approved a proposed settlement of the 
PRIDES case presented by lead counsel and Cendant. The 
proposed settlement provided that, in return for dismissal 
and release of all claims, Cendant would confer upon each 
class member who opted in, one "Right" worth $11.71 for 
each PRIDES held at the close of business on April 15, 
1998, giving the settlement an aggregate theoretical value 
of $341.5 million. The March 18, 1999 order also approved 
the "form and content" of notice to be distributed to class 
members regarding the settlement. That notice stated that 
lead counsel would apply for attorneys' fees, to be paid in 
Rights, in an amount not to exceed 10% of the $341.5 
million theoretical value of the settlement. To this effect, the 
notice contained the following assurance: 
 
       You also should know that the lead counsel 
       appointment process included a court-mandated 
       bidding process. This was intended to assure that the 
       largest possible portion of any recovery remained with 
       participating class members, or conversely that 
       qualified lead counsel took the least possible sums 
       from the benefits to be obtained by participating class 
       members. In Lead Counsel's view, under the fee 
       mechanism proposed by Lead Counsel and described 
       herein, there is a substantial likelihood that a 
       substantial part, if not all, of the fees sought will be 
       obtained from Unclaimed Rights and Opt Out Rights. 
       As a consequence, in Lead Counsel's view, those Class 
       Members who become Authorized Claimants will not 
       have to pay any of Lead Counsel's fees, or if they do, 
       there is a substantial likelihood that it will be less than 
       the amount otherwise payable under the bids approved 
       by the Court in the process of appointing lead counsel. 
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In re Cendant Corp. Prides Litig., No. 98-2819, slip op. at 
___ (D.N.J. Mar. 18, 1999) (emphasis added) (order 
regarding proposed class action settlement, settlement 
hearing and notice of proposed settlement). 
 
Besides preliminary approval and notice, the order of 
March 18, 1999 also provided that any class member 
wishing to object to the settlement or to the lead counsel's 
fee application should file written objections with the 
District Court. On May 4, 1999, Sirota, along with co- 
counsel, filed objections on behalf of Aboff to the proposed 
settlement and to lead counsel's application for fees. In 
particular, the brief submitted by Sirota argued that "the 
$34 million fee Lead Counsel seeks far exceeds the fee Lead 
Counsel agreed to accept [in the bidding auction]." 
 
On May 14, 1999, the New York Times published an 
article stating, "Mr. Sirota calculates that the value of [lead 
counsel's proposed fee] would be $34 million, and argues 
that it would thus be about 10 percent of the total 
settlement fund a percentage he contends greatly exceeds 
the confidential bid that [lead counsel] submitted to the 
court last year." Diana B. Henriques, Lawyers Handling 
Litigation Against Cendant Propose an Innovative Way to 
Pay Their Fees, N.Y. Times, May 14, 1999, at C7. Seeing 
this article, the District Court issued an order"to show 
cause why [Sirota] should not be held in contempt and 
sanctioned for violations of this Court's confidentiality order 
of October 2, 1998."4 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
4. In its entirety, the order provided: 
 
The Court brings this matter on its own initiative for Howard B. Sirota 
to be ordered to show cause why he should not be held in contempt and 
sanctioned for violations of this Court's confidentiality order of October 
2, 1998 as reported in the New York Times on May 14, 1999 ("Mr. Sirota 
calculates that the value of that compensation [Kirby's proposed fee] 
would be $34 million, and argues that it would thus be about 10 percent 
of the total settlement fund--a percentage he contends greatly exceeds 
the confidential bid that the Kirby firm submitted to the court last 
year."). 
 
It is on this 17th day of May, 1999: 
 
ORDERED that Mr. Sirota appear before this Court on the 19th day of 
May, 1999 at 10:00 a.m. to show cause why he has not violated this 
Court's confidentiality order of October 2, 1998 and why he should not 
be held in contempt and sanctioned. 
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On May 19, 1999, the District Court held a hearing on 
the order to show cause, focusing on whether Sirota's 
apparent statement to the New York Times concerning lead 
counsel's bid violated the October 2, 1998 confidentiality 
order. Defending himself, Sirota explained that: (1) he had 
no intention to violate the confidentiality order; (2) he had 
simply told a reporter from the New York Times that he had 
filed an objection with the District Court; (3) he did not 
make any substantive comments to the reporter; (4) the 
newspaper article merely referred to arguments made in his 
written objection of May 4, 1999; and (5) Sirota believed 
that the relative comparisons made in the written objection 
had been authorized by the District Court's March 18, 1999 
order. As to the last point, Sirota noted that the March 18, 
1999 order which preliminarily approved the settlement of 
the PRIDES case, also approved a form of notice stating 
lead counsel's belief that the attorneys' fees would be less 
than provided for by the bidding process. Thus, Sirota 
argued that it was reasonable for him to believe that the 
confidentiality order did not prohibit him from responding 
to lead counsel's contention that the proposed fee was less 
than the bid by arguing that it was actually more than the 
bid: 
 
       [Because of the notice], the defendants and everyone 
       else knew the relative magnitude of the fee sought and 
       that according to [lead counsel] it was not more than 
       the bid. The rationale of keeping the defendants from 
       knowing the amount of the compensation of their 
       adversary, I thought, was over as reflected in the Court 
       authorized notice and reflected in [lead counsel's] 
       understanding that one could make claims. [Lead 
       counsel] made the claim in the notice . . . . The Court 
       invited objections in the notice and we came and said 
       truthfully he is asking for more than his bid. 
 
Thereafter, the District Court stated that it had"no 
problem" with Sirota making this argument in court, but 
that speaking to the press was different. 
 
At the conclusion of the hearing, the District Court 
determined that finding Sirota in contempt was 
unwarranted. Nevertheless, relying on Local Civil Rule 
101.1 and on its inherent power to discipline attorneys, the 
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District Court imposed sanctions on Sirota for violating the 
confidentiality order. The District Court explained: 
 
       Why am I doing that? Because having you yourself 
       admitted to twenty years before a bar if not the New 
       Jersey bar, I hold you to that of a reasonable attorney 
       who, when confronted with a specific order of 
       confidentiality, a specific order of confidentiality before 
       he would broach the subject to a third party such as 
       the press, whether generally or specifically, he should 
       have, in good conscience or in good professionalism at 
       least made contact with the Court to insure that 
       whatever he said did not violate the order. To come to 
       court now and say that because there is a, the 
       reference is made by lead counsel in the notice to 
       claimants that one feels free to do what you did is not 
       good enough as far as I'm concerned . . . 
 
        . . . . 
 
       You have a professional obligation to, as counsel for 
       the objector, to point out to the Court your objection. 
       I don't understand it. Maybe I never practiced in New 
       York, but, I didn't think you had a professional 
       obligation to point out your objection with regard to 
       this matter to a newspaper. 
 
The next day, May 20, 1999, the District Court entered an 
order, fining Sirota $1,000. 
 
On June 18, 1999, Sirota filed a notice of appeal from the 
order imposing sanctions. We have jurisdiction over this 
appeal pursuant to the final order doctrine of 28 U.S.C. 
S 1291. This includes final decisions in attorney disciplinary 
proceedings. See In re Ashton, 768 F.2d 74 (3d Cir. 1985); 
In re Abrams, 521 F.2d 1091 (3d Cir. 1975). 5 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
5. We note that on June 25, 1999, the District Court approved a 
settlement in the Cendant PRIDES case and certified the judgment 
embodying that settlement and awarding attorneys' fees to lead counsel 
as final under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 54(b). In re Cendant Corp. 
PRIDES Litig., 51 F. Supp. 2d 537 (D.N.J. 1999), rev'd, 243 F.3d 722 (3d 
Cir. 2001). If Sirota's appeal from the sanctions order were construed as 
premature, it would have ripened upon entry of the final judgment in the 
Cendant PRIDES case. See Lazy Oil Co. v. Witco Corp., 166 F.3d 581 (3d 
Cir. 1999). 
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II. 
 
The nominal issue on appeal is whether the District 
Court erred in sanctioning Sirota for violating the October 
2, 1998 confidentiality order by speaking to the New York 
Times. That issue, however, is predicated upon the more 
basic question of whether the confidentiality order 
underlying the sanction was properly issued. Because of 
this dependent relationship, we feel compelled, before even 
considering the District Court's sanction of Sirota, to first 
address the propriety of the confidentiality order. What 
constitutes the proper legal standard for granting a 
confidentiality order sealing bids is an issue of law, over 
which we exercise plenary review. See Pansy v. Borough of 
Stroudsburg, 23 F.3d 772, 783-84 (3d Cir. 1994). 
 
In addition to this dependent relationship, we also have 
an inherent supervisory power, arising out of Fed. R. Civ. P. 
26, to fashion and clarify rules for district courts governing 
the district courts' power to enter confidentiality orders at 
the discovery stage or any other stage of litigation. See 
Pansy, 23 F.3d at 786 & n.16, 789 & n.22. Accordingly, 
there exists a sufficient basis for us to evaluate the District 
Court's efforts to preserve the secrecy of bids. In doing so, 
we conclude that, in deciding to seal the bids, the District 
Court failed to recognize that the bids were judicial records, 
subject to the common law presumption of public access. 
As a result, the District Court failed to articulate the 
necessary findings to override the presumption of access 
when issuing the confidentiality order. 
 
A. 
 
It is well-settled that there exists, in both criminal and 
civil cases, a common law public right of access to judicial 
proceedings and records. Littlejohn v. BIC Corporation, 851 
F.2d 673, 677-78 (3d Cir. 1988). The public's right of 
access extends beyond simply the ability to attend open 
court proceedings. Rather, it envisions "a pervasive 
common law right `to inspect and copy public records and 
documents, including judicial records and documents.' " 
Leucadia, Inc. v. Applied Extrusion Tech., Inc., 998 F.2d 
157, 161 (3d Cir. 1993). As we explained in Littlejohn, the 
right of access strengthens confidence in the courts: 
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       The public's exercise of its common law access right in 
       civil cases promotes public confidence in the judicial 
       system by enhancing testimonial trustworthiness and 
       the quality of justice dispensed by the court. As with 
       other branches of government, the bright light cast 
       upon the judicial process by public observation 
       diminishes possibilities for injustice, incompetence, 
       perjury, and fraud. Furthermore, the very openness of 
       the process should provide the public with a more 
       complete understanding of the judicial system and a 
       better perception of its fairness. 
 
851 F.2d at 678 (citations omitted). In addition,"[a]ccess to 
civil proceedings and records promotes `public respect for 
the judicial process' and helps assure that judges perform 
their duties in an honest and informed manner." Leucadia, 
998 F.2d at 161 (citations and internal quotations omitted). 
 
The public right of access clearly applies to the in camera 
hearing conducted by the District Court, as that hearing 
was a judicial proceeding. We also believe that the right 
applies to the bids. Whether or not a document or record is 
subject to the right of access turns on whether that item is 
considered to be a "judicial record." Pansy, 23 F.3d at 781. 
The status of a document as a "judicial record," in turn, 
depends on whether a document has been filed with the 
court, or otherwise somehow incorporated or integrated into 
a district court's adjudicatory proceedings. Id.  at 780-83. 
While filing clearly establishes such status, a document 
may still be construed as a judicial record, absent filing, if 
a court interprets or enforces the terms of that document, 
or requires that it be submitted to the court under seal. See 
Enprotech Corp. v. Renda, 983 F.2d 17, 20 (3d Cir. 1993); 
but cf. Pansy, 23 F.3d at 780-83.6  Especially relevant here 
is the case of Leucadia, in which we held that "there is a 
presumptive right of public access to pretrial motions of a 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
6. Pansy held that a settlement agreement not filed with the district 
court, but submitted to and reviewed by that court, was not a judicial 
record. However, Pansy's holding is inapplicable here because, among 
other reasons, unlike the settlement agreement in that case, the records 
at issue here were submitted at the District Court's request and were 
generated in connection with the litigation. 
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nondiscovery nature, whether preliminary or dispositive, 
and the material filed in connection therewith." 998 F.2d at 
164. 
 
In the present case, the District Court's auction 
procedure transformed the bids into judicial records. The 
District Court relied on the 1995 Personal Securities 
Litigation Reform Act ("PSLRA") as authority for the 
selection by lead plaintiffs of lead counsel. The PSLRA 
provides: "The most adequate plaintiff shall, subject to the 
approval of the court, select and retain counsel to represent 
the class." 15 U.S.C. S 77z-1(a)(3)(B)(v) (emphasis added). 
Viewing its approval under the PSLRA as a discretionary 
judgment, the District Court ordered plaintiffs' attorneys to 
submit bids, In re Cendant Corp. Litig., 182 F.R.D. at 150- 
51, and the attorneys did so in direct response to the 
court's command. While not explicitly denominated as 
such, the bids were essentially submitted in the form of 
motions to be appointed lead counsel. See id.  at 151 
(ordering bidders to describe why they are professionally 
qualified to be lead counsel). Following the in camera 
hearing, the District Court ruled, and issued an Order 
appointing counsel. In re Cendant Corp. Litig. , 191 F.R.D. at 
387. That Order, a public document itself, summarized the 
content of the bids in an encoded chart. Id. In these 
circumstances, we believe that, at the time of the District 
Court's confidentiality order, the bids were judicial 
documents subject to the common law right to access. 
 
B. 
 
The practical effect of the right to access doctrine is to 
create an independent right for the public to view 
proceedings and to inspect judicial records. See Pansy, 23 
F.3d at 781. The right of public access is particularly 
compelling here, because many members of the "public" are 
also plaintiffs in the class action. Accordingly, all the 
reasons we discussed in Littlejohn for the right of access to 
public records apply with even greater force here. See p. 10, 
supra. Protecting the access right in class actions 
"promotes [class members'] confidence" in the 
administration of the case. Littlejohn, 851 F.2d at 678. 
Additionally, the right of access diminishes the possibility 
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that "injustice, incompetence, perjury, [or] fraud" will be 
perpetrated against those class members who have some 
stake in the case but are not at the forefront of the 
litigation. Id. Finally, openness of class actions provides 
class members with "a more complete understanding of the 
[class action process] and a better perception of its 
fairness." Id. 
 
Indeed, the information sealed in this case and kept 
secret from most of the parties was of the utmost 
importance in the administration of the case; it was directly 
relevant to the selection of lead counsel. This point is 
crucial. In class actions, the lead attorneys have an 
unusual amount of control over information concerning the 
litigation. By contrast, class members often have little input 
into the conduct of the class action and accompanying 
settlement negotiations, because of the large scale of 
litigation and the disconnect between defendants' possibly 
enormous liability and the relatively small recovery 
available to the individual plaintiffs. The only stage at 
which class members can exercise effective control is in the 
selection of class counsel. Throwing a veil of secrecy over 
the selection process deprives class members of that 
opportunity. 
 
Thus, there should have been, in the present case, a 
strong presumption that the bids and the in camera 
proceeding would be part of an open process, accessible to 
the public. See Littlejohn, 851 F.2d at 678. That 
presumption disallows the routine and perfunctory closing 
of judicial records. Miller v. Indiana Hosp., 16 F.3d 549, 
551 (3d Cir. 1994). Our discussion, however, does not end 
here. 
 
Although the common law right to public access is a 
recognized and venerated principle, courts have also 
recognized the accompanying principle that "the right is not 
absolute." Littlejohn, 851 F.2d at 678; Leucadia, 998 F.2d 
at 165 (same); Publicker Indus., Inc. v. Cohen , 733 F.2d 
1059, 1070 (3d Cir. 1984) (same). The presumption of 
public access may be rebutted. See Republic of Phillipines v. 
Westinghouse Elec. Corp., 949 F.2d 653, 662 (3d Cir. 1991). 
"Every court has supervisory power over its own records 
and files, and access has been denied where court files 
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might have become a vehicle for improper purposes." 
Littlejohn, 851 F.2d at 678 (quoting Nixon v. Warner 
Communications, Inc., 435 U.S. 589, 598 (1978)). Thus, the 
question becomes, under what circumstances may a 
district court seal judicial proceedings or documents, such 
as bids, by means of a confidentiality order. For this 
question, there are settled standards. 
 
In order to override the common law right of access, the 
party seeking the closure of a hearing or the sealing of part 
of the judicial record "bears the burden of showing that the 
material is the kind of information that courts will protect" 
and that "disclosure will work a clearly defined and serious 
injury to the party seeking closure." Miller , 16 F.3d at 551 
(citing Publicker, 733 F.2d at 1071). In delineating the 
injury to be prevented, specificity is essential. See Publicker, 
733 F.2d at 1071. Broad allegations of harm, bereft of 
specific examples or articulated reasoning, are insufficient. 
As is often the case when there are conflicting interests, a 
balancing process is contemplated. "[T]he strong common 
law presumption of access must be balanced against the 
factors militating against access. The burden is on the 
party who seeks to overcome the presumption of access to 
show that the interest in secrecy outweighs the 
presumption." Leucadia, 998 F.2d at 165 (quoting Bank of 
Am. Nat'l Trust and Sav. Ass'n v. Hotel Rittenhouse Assoc., 
800 F.2d 339, 344 (3d Cir. 1986)). 
 
Additionally, because of the peculiar posture of class 
actions whereby some members of the public are also 
parties to the class action, and because of the importance 
of selection of lead counsel to class action plaintiffs, the 
test for overriding the right of access should be applied in 
this case with particular strictness. We are guided in the 
formation of a stricter standard by Miller, where the sealing 
order warranted exceptional scrutiny because the district 
court had sealed the entire record. In that case, we held: 
 
       In a case such as this, involving ordinary civil 
       litigation, the district court, before taking such an 
       unusual step, should have articulated the compelling 
       countervailing interests to be protected, made specific 
       findings on the record concerning the effects of 
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       disclosure, and provided an opportunity for interested 
       third parties to be heard. 
 
Miller, 16 F.3d at 551 (citations omitted) (emphasis added). 
Thus, we hold that a "compelling countervailing interests" 
standard is most appropriate here, with the additional 
requirement of specific findings. This may or may not 
require a hearing. 
 
Therefore, our emphasis here is on the District Court's 
denial of public access to the bids and proceedings in 
connection with the sealed bid auction employed to select 
lead counsel in this case, and we do not focus here nor 
decide on the propriety of bid auctions generally. 
 
In re Oracle Sec. Litig., 136 F.R.D. 639 (N.D. Cal. 1991), 
the district court case relied upon by the District Court in 
the present case, admittedly is one of the earliest cases in 
which competitive bids for lead counsel and the propriety of 
sealing such bids was considered.7 Oracle opted for 
competitive selection of class counsel for a number of 
reasons which we decline to explore inasmuch as the issue 
of competitive selection is not presented on this appeal. 
Suffice it to say, the reasons listed in Oracle  for use of 
competitive bidding provoke serious reservations and 
concerns here,8 but we leave the decision as to whether 
competitive bidding is appropriate, justifiable, or desirable 
to the future case where that issue is directly raised. 
 
Regardless of whether bidding for lead counsel would be 
deemed appropriate, however, we can neither subscribe to 
nor affirm the District Court's ruling that the bidding 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
7. We do note, for background purposes, that lead counsel auctions have 
not been widely used by federal courts. See Developments, The Paths of 
Civil Litigation, 113 Harv. L. Rev. 1827, 1842 (2000) [Civil Litigation] 
(noting that auctions have been used in only four federal district courts, 
and only within the securities and antitrust context). Recently, Chief 
Judge Becker of this Court formed a task force to examine in detail the 
competitive bidding process and the method of selecting lead counsel in 
federal class action litigation. See Editorials, Class-Counsel Auctions, 
N.J.L.J., Feb. 12, 2000, at 22. 
 
8. Indeed, one district court has affirmatively rejected bid auctions, 
holding that such auctions violate the PSLRA. See In re Razorfish, Inc. 
Sec. Litig., 143 F. Supp. 2d 304, 311 (S.D.N.Y. 2001). 
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auction the court conducted should have been closed, i.e., 
sealed and kept from the very parties to whom our 
precedents and logic advocate disclosure. Indeed, this very 
principle was recognized in Oracle, where the court refused 
to seal or hold secret the bids for class counsel. 
 
The Oracle court did this in part by rejecting claims that 
an open bidding process would allow the defendants to 
obtain information about lead counsel's evaluation of the 
case and might permit them to economically "squeeze" lead 
counsel by protracting proceedings. The Oracle  court 
opined, as we do, that disclosure of class counsel's bids 
and compensation arrangements benefits the class because, 
"[u]nlike the usual attorney-client situation, . . . class 
members do not participate in the negotiations by which a 
part of their claim is bargained away." 136 F.R.D. at 645. 
Moreover, class members are not in a position to monitor 
the faithfulness of their self-appointed champion. See, e.g., 
In re General Motors Corp. Pick-Up Truck Fuel Tank Prods. 
Liab. Litig., 55 F.3d 768 (3d Cir. 1995) (where the original 
settlement called for lead counsel to receive attorneys' fees 
in the amount of $9.5 million, and class plaintiffs received 
no more than a $1,000 certificate towards a GM truck). 
 
Thus, we generally believe that opening the bidding 
process (if such a process is to be authorized), while not a 
panacea for the agency problems in class actions, should 
facilitate the monitoring of lead counsel by class members 
and others. The disclosure of bids also comports with the 
spirit of the Model Rules of Professional Conduct. See 
Model Rules of Prof 'l Conduct R. 1.5(b) (1983) (requiring 
communication to the client of the "basis or rate of the fee 
. . . before or within a reasonable time after commencing 
the representation"). 
 
We find implicit recognition of these principles in the 
1985 Third Circuit Task Force report on court-awarded 
attorneys' fees. In analogous circumstances, the Task Force 
expressed concern that, when lead counsel seeks fees after 
a settlement has been reached, "the plaintiffs' attorney's 
role changes from one of a fiduciary for the clients to that 
of a claimant against the fund created for the clients' 
benefit." Court Awarded Attorney Fees, Report of the Third 
Circuit Task Force, 108 F.R.D. 237, 255 (1985)[hereinafter 
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Task Force Report]. The Task Force Report  accordingly 
recommended that district courts force the negotiation of 
class counsel's fee, asserting the "critical importance [in] 
assuring that the compensation plan is negotiated in an 
open and appropriately arm's length manner." Id. at 256 
(emphasis added). 
 
The strong presumption of public access forces district 
courts to be cognizant of when the reasons supporting 
sealing in a specific case (if any are found) have either 
passed or weakened, and to be prepared at that time to 
unseal bids and allow public access. Even if a sealing order 
was proper at the time when it was initially imposed, the 
sealing order must be lifted at the earliest possible moment 
when the reasons for sealing no longer obtain. As we 
observed in Leucadia, "continued sealing must be based on 
`current evidence to show how public dissemination of the 
pertinent materials now would cause the competitive harm 
[they] claim[ ]." 998 F.2d 157, 167 (3d Cir. 1993) (emphasis 
added). By establishing a strong presumption in favor of an 
open process, we intend to instill a measure of consistency 
into an important area where district courts have varied 
widely in their practice.9 
 
III. 
 
The heightened standard which we have held must be 
applied to sealing class action bids is also supported by the 
language and legislative history of the PSLRA.10 The PSLRA 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
9.  In cases employing competitive bidding to select lead counsel, some 
district courts have used what appear to be an open, unsealed bidding 
process. See, e.g., In re California Micro Devices Sec. Litig., 168 F.R.D. 
257, 259-60 (N.D. Cal. 1996). Other courts have sealed the bids but later 
unsealed them when the lead counsel was selected. See, e.g., In re Amino 
Acid Lysine, 918 F. Supp. 1190, 1192, 1201 (N.D. Ill. 1996); In re Bank 
One S'holders Class Actions, 96 F. Supp. 2d 780, 782, 785 (N.D. Ill. 
2000); In re Wells Fargo Sec. Litig., 157 F.R.D. 467, 468 (N.D. Cal. 
1995). 
Besides the District Court here, we have found only one other court that 
has utilized a completely sealed bidding process. See In re Auction 
Houses Antitrust Litig., 197 F.R.D. 71, 74, 84 (S.D.N.Y. 2000). 
 
10. It should be noted that the District Court applied the provisions of 
the PSLRA several times in the course of the Cendant litigation, though 
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sets forth a detailed procedure for class members to apply 
to become lead plaintiffs. Additionally, the PSLRA provides 
that "[t]he most adequate plaintiff11 shall, subject to the 
approval of the court, select and retain counsel to represent 
the class." 15 U.S.C. S 77z-1(a)(3)(B)(iv). 
 
       The legislative history of the PSLRA explains that the 
       Act's purpose is: 
 
       (1) to encourage the voluntary disclosure of information 
       by corporate issuers; (2) to empower investors so that 
       they--not their lawyers--exercise primary control over 
       private securities litigation; and (3) to encourage 
       plaintiffs' lawyers to pursue valid claims and 
       defendants to fight abusive claims. 
 
S.Rep. No. 104-98, at 4 (1995), reprinted in 1995 
U.S.C.C.A.N. 679, 683 (emphasis added). 
 
The legislative history also points out that "[i]nvestors in 
the class usually have great difficulty exercising any 
meaningful direction over the case brought on their behalf. 
The lawyers can decide when to sue and when to settle, 
based largely on their own financial interests, not the 
interests of their purported clients." S. Rep., U.S.C.C.A.N. 
at 685. Additionally: 
 
       A 1994 Securities Subcommittee Staff Report found 
       `evidence * * * that plaintiffs' counsel in many 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
never in the context of selection of lead counsel. See, e.g., In re 
Cendant 
Corp. Litig., 139 F. Supp. 2d 585 (D.N.J. 2001) (PSLRA barred 
contribution claims); In re Cendant Corp. Litig. , 109 F. Supp. 2d 285 
(D.N.J. 2000) (attorneys' fees awarded pursuant to the PSLRA); In re 
Cendant Corp. Litig., 109 F. Supp. 2d 235 (D.N.J. 2000) (applied PSLRA 
in connection with notice of proposed settlement); In re Cendant Corp. 
Litig., 76 F. Supp. 2d 539 (D.N.J. 1999) (PSLRA requires showing of 
scienter in securities fraud action). 
 
11. The PSLRA states that the court "shall appoint as lead plaintiff the 
member or members of the purported plaintiff class that the court 
determines to be the most capable of adequately representing the 
interests of class members (hereinafter in this paragraph referred to as 
the `most adequate plaintiff ') . . ." 15 U.S.C. S 77z-1(a)(3)(B)(i) 
(emphasis 
added). 
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       instances litigate with a view toward ensuring payment 
       for their services without sufficient regard to whether 
       their clients are receiving adequate compensation in 
       light of evidence of wrongdoing.' The comment by one 
       plaintiffs' lawyer--`I have the greatest practice of law in 
       the world. I have no clients.'--aptly summarizes this 
       flaw in the current system. 
 
S. Rep., U.S.C.C.A.N. at 685. 
 
To regulate this practice of lawyers, instead of lead 
plaintiffs, driving securities class actions, Congress enacted 
the PSLRA, through which, "[s]ubject to court approval, the 
most adequate plaintiff retains class counsel." H. Conf. 
Rep. No. 104-369, at 35 (1995), reprinted in 1995 
U.S.C.C.A.N. 679, 734. The Senate Committee explained: 
"This provision is intended to permit the plaintiff to choose 
counsel rather than have counsel choose the plaintiff." 
S.Rep. No. 104-98, at 11 (1995), reprinted in  1995 
U.S.C.C.A.N. 679, 690 (emphasis added). 
 
Congress' clear intent in enacting the PSLRA was to 
transfer control of securities class actions from the 
attorneys to the class members (through a properly selected 
lead plaintiff). The sealing of the bids in the lead counsel 
auction in this case contravenes this purpose. Instead of 
allowing the class plaintiffs in this action to choose lead 
counsel, the District Court selected class counsel through 
a sealed bidding process which has yet to be unsealed. It 
also prevented many class plaintiffs and defendants from 
accessing the bids for lead counsel. Sealing the bids in this 
case enabled counsel to " `litigate with a view toward 
ensuring payment for their services without sufficient 
regard to whether their clients are receiving adequate 
compensation in light of evidence of wrongdoing.' " S.Rep., 
U.S.C.C.A.N. at 685.12 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
12. We do recognize that, in this case, the District Court gave lead 
plaintiffs' counsel the option of matching the most acceptable bid and 
becoming lead counsel. 
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IV. 
 
Of course, notwithstanding the limitations on sealing 
created by the common law public right to access,"[t]he 
balancing of the factors for and against access is a decision 
committed to the discretion of the district court, although 
it is not generally accorded the narrow review reserved for 
discretionary decisions based on first-hand observations." 
Bank of Am. Nat'l Trust and Sav. Ass'n v. Hotel Rittenhouse 
Assocs., 800 F.2d 339, 344 (3d Cir. 1986). The discretion 
that exists, however, must be exercised properly because 
the issuance of a confidentiality order overriding the 
common law right of public access contemplates an 
analytical process. 
 
In this respect, we hold that the District Court abused its 
discretion in sealing the bids. Apart from one general and 
ambiguous reference to "adversarial integrity" and "strategy 
and tactics," the District Court did not provide any clear 
reason for why it sealed the bids. The court did not 
recognize the presumption of access, nor did it engage in 
balancing process to determine whether the bids were the 
type of information normally protected or whether there 
was a clearly defined injury to be prevented. See Publicker, 
733 F.2d at 1073 (noting similar procedural deficiencies in 
the context of the First Amendment right to access); accord 
Criden, 648 F.2d at 819 (stating that district courts must 
"provide a firm base for an appellate judgment that 
discretion was soundly exercised"). Here, before sealing the 
entire bid record, the District Court should have articulated 
the "compelling countervailing interests" it found which 
would authorize the closure through sealing of the matters 
it sought to protect. Miller, 16 F.3d at 551. No such 
factfinding or identification of compelling countervailing 
interests can be found in the District Court's order. We 
therefore conclude that the District Court's confidentiality 
order of October 2, 1998, was improperly issued, and 
therefore, invalid.13 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
13. In addition to the common law right of access, we note that the Third 
Circuit has held that the "First Amendment [also] embraces a right of 
access to [civil] trials." Publicker , 733 F.2d at 1070 (citation and 
internal 
quotations omitted). This right exists independently of the common law 
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V. 
 
In addition to concluding that the October 2, 1998 
confidentiality order was improperly issued, we conclude 
that the District Court erred in finding that Sirota violated 
the terms of the order. This point is important because, 
among other reasons, the fine was widely reported in the 
newspapers and legal journals, and because attorney 
disciplinary authorities in New York have initiated an 
inquiry, which is still pending, to determine whether Sirota 
should be sanctioned in New York based on the same facts 
that led the District Court to impose the fine. 
 
Sirota's principal argument is that the District Court 
abused its discretion in sanctioning him $1,000 for 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
right of access. See Republic of Phillipines v. Westinghouse Elec. Corp., 
949 F.2d 653, 659 (3d Cir. 1991). The general rationale behind this right 
is that "[p]ublic access to civil trials . . . plays an important role in 
the 
participation and the free discussion of governmental affairs." Publicker, 
733 F.2d at 1070; see also Globe Newspaper Co. v. Superior Court for the 
County of Norfolk, 457 U.S. 555, 604-05 (1980) ("[T]o the extent that the 
First Amendment embraces a right of access to criminal trials, it is to 
ensure that this constitutionally protected `discussion of governmental 
affairs' is an informed one."). 
 
The First Amendment right of access requires a much higher showing 
than the common law right to access before a judicial proceeding can be 
sealed. In Publicker, for example, we stated that "to limit the public's 
access to civil trials [where First Amendment right to access applies,] 
there must be a showing that the denial serves an important 
governmental interest and that there is no less restrictive way to serve 
that governmental interest." 733 F.2d at 1070. We also described certain 
procedural and substantive requirements that are required when the 
First Amendment applies. 733 F.2d at 1071-73. 
 
However, the parameters of the First Amendment right of access to 
civil proceedings are undefined. There remain significant constitutional 
questions about what documents are subject to its reach. See Littlejohn, 
851 F.2d at 680 n.14. Because we conclude that the District Court's 
confidentiality order did not satisfy the requirements for abridging even 
the common law right of access, we will not address these issues. See 
Hagan v. Lavine, 415 U.S. 528, 547 (1974) (noting "the ordinary rule 
that a federal court should not decide federal constitutional questions 
where a dispositive nonconstitutional ground is available"). 
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speaking to a newspaper reporter. " `We review a district 
court's imposition of sanctions under its inherent power for 
abuse of discretion.' " Republic of Philippines v. 
Westinghouse Elec. Corp., 43 F.3d 65, 75 (3d Cir. 1994) 
(quoting Chambers v. NASCO, Inc., 501 U.S. 32, 55 (1991)). 
A district court "abuse[s] its discretion if it base[s] its ruling 
on an erroneous view of the law or on a clearly erroneous 
assessment of the evidence." Garr v. U.S. Healthcare, Inc., 
22 F.3d 1274, 1279 (3d Cir. 1994) (citation and internal 
quotations omitted). 
 
At the sanction hearing, the District Court informed 
Sirota that it was proceeding pursuant to L.Civ.R. 101.1, 
which gives the court broad authority to discipline 
attorneys. Clearly, the court had authority to proceed under 
this Rule and under its inherent disciplinary jurisdiction. 
 
The Supreme Court has long established that "[c]ourts of 
justice are universally acknowledged to be vested, by their 
very creation, with power to impose silence, respect, and 
decorum, in their presence, and submission to their lawful 
mandates." Anderson v. Dunn, 19 U.S. (6 Wheat.) 204, 227 
(1821); accord Ex parte Robinson, 86 U.S. (19 Wall.) 505, 
510 (1873). This Court, as well, has recognized the 
authority of district courts to wield sanctioning power, in 
the form of the court's "inherent authority," where 
necessary to preserve the integrity of the judicial process. 
Philippines, 43 F.3d at 73; accord Eash v. Riggins Trucking, 
Inc., 757 F.2d 557, 560-65 (3d Cir. 1985) (discussing 
thoroughly the inherent powers of courts); In re Corn 
Derivatives Antitrust Litig., 748 F.2d 157, 160 (3d Cir. 
1984); In re Abrams, 521 F.2d 1094, 1099 (3d Cir. 1975); 
11A Charles A. Wright et al., Federal Practice and Procedure 
S 2960 (2d ed. 1995) (analyzing the inherent power of 
federal courts to punish in contempt). 
 
We have emphatically stated that federal courts retain 
the inherent power "to sanction errant attorneys financially 
both for contempt and for conduct not rising to the level of 
contempt." Eash, 757 F.2d at 566 (citing Roadway Express, 
Inc. v. Piper, 447 U.S. 752, 765 (1980)). The Eash court 
elaborated: 
 
       [The] Supreme Court . . . [has] stat[ed] that the 
       "inherent power" to sanction an attorney was"governed 
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       not by rule or statute but by the control necessarily 
       vested in courts to manage their own affairs so as to 
       achieve the orderly and expeditious disposition of 
       cases." If a court's inherent powers include the ability 
       to do whatever is reasonably necessary to deter abuse 
       of the judicial process, . . . courts must be able to 
       impose reasonable sanctions for conduct by lawyers 
       that falls short of contempt of court. 
 
Id. at 567 (citations omitted). 
 
Requiring courts to await the conclusion of extensive 
investigation and prosecution procedures following every 
courtroom infraction would greatly compromise the courts' 
ability to direct and control the proceedings. Acknowledging 
the weighty interest judges have in maintaining order in 
court affairs, we have recognized that "district courts have 
broad authority to preserve and protect their essential 
functions." Philippines, 43 F.3d at 73. We have also 
previously observed that formal rules and statutes do not 
exhaust a district court's power to control errant behavior: 
 
       To the contrary, the Supreme Court recently reaffirmed 
       that a district court has inherent authority to impose 
       sanctions upon those who would abuse the judicial 
       process. . . . The Supreme Court explained that"[i]t 
       has long been understood that certain implied powers 
       must necessarily result to our Courts of justice from 
       the nature of their institution, powers which cannot be 
       dispensed with in a Court, because they are necessary 
       to the exercise of all others." 
 
Id. at 73 (quoting Chambers v. NASCO, Inc., 501 U.S. 32, 
43-44 (1991) (internal quotations and citations omitted)). 
Before invoking its inherent authority, a court must 
consider a number of factors: 
 
       Of course, "[b]ecause of their very potency, inherent 
       powers must be exercised with restraint and 
       discretion." "A primary aspect of [a district court's] 
       discretion is the ability to fashion an appropriate 
       sanction for conduct which abuses the judicial 
       process." Thus, a district court must ensure that there 
       is an adequate factual predicate for flexing its 
       substantial muscle under its inherent powers, and 
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       must also ensure that the sanction is tailored to 
       address the harm identified. . . . [T]he court must 
       consider the conduct at issue and explain why the 
       conduct warrants sanction. 
 
Id. at 74 (quoting Chambers, 501 U.S. at 44). 
 
Here, we are constrained to conclude that no adequate 
factual predicate existed to justify the exercise of the 
District Court's inherent authority. The proceeding against 
Sirota commenced when the court initially charged him 
with violating its confidentiality order. Sirota conceded that 
he had spoken to the New York Times without initially 
approaching the District Court, but insisted that he had 
divulged no information of substance: 
 
       I spoke to the New York Times and said we filed a brief 
       and if you want to see it, you can see it. And, I have 
       confirmed with the author of the article that she was 
       quoting from the brief and that I made no substantive 
       oral statement to the New York Times. They are 
       quoting from our brief. 
 
The District Court did not dispute the truth of Sirota's 
assertion. Instead, the court seems only to have stated that 
Sirota's behavior breached standards of "good conscience or 
. . . good professionalism": 
 
       I hold you to that of a reasonable attorney who, when 
       confronted with a specific order of confidentiality,. . . 
       before he would broach the subject to a third party 
       such as the press, whether generally or specifically, he 
       should have, in good conscience or in good 
       professionalism at least made contact with the Court to 
       insure that whatever he said did not violate the order. 
 
Certainly, a violation of the confidentiality order would 
constitute "conduct which abuses the judicial process" and 
could justify a sanction. However, the record does not 
support a finding that Sirota violated any order. 
 
Amicus counsel, in support of the District Court's order, 
argues that Sirota did, in fact, violate the confidentiality 
order because Sirota's brief may have, by implication, 
identified two bidders for the lead counsel position, himself 
and Kirby. The problem with this contention is that Sirota's 
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brief was not under seal, was available to the general 
public, and did not expressly divulge the identity of any 
bidder. In essence, the brief is nothing more than a 
response to the court's order of March 18, 1999, which 
required that any class member wishing to contest an 
aspect of the settlement "file said objections, papers and 
briefs with the Clerk of the United States District Court for 
the District of New Jersey." 
 
We further observe that, when Sirota asserted at the 
hearing that all the information recited by the reporter 
simply derived from material "[w]e filed . . . in our briefs 
before your Honor," the court responded, "I don't have any 
problem with that in court. I have no problem with your 
objecting in court, none whatsoever, none whatsoever." 
Thus, under the District Court's reading, Sirota was free to 
present in open court the same material he presented in his 
brief. The public, including the media, had a right of access 
to all such material. See Leucadia, 998 F.2d at 161 ("the 
public has the right to inspect and copy judicial records"). 
While it would be improper for an attorney to divulge the 
substance of a case that the court has deemed confidential, 
the public's right of access demands that the attorney 
must, at the very least, be able to refer a reporter to a 
public document. 
 
Finding that his written submissions did not offend the 
confidentiality order, the Court, instead, objected solely to 
Sirota's contact with the media. However, because the 
District Court could not identify any improper extrajudicial 
statement, it could not sanction Sirota for contacting the 
media in violation of the confidentiality order. See L. Civ. R. 
105.1 ("Notwithstanding [the Local Rules on extrajudicial 
statements], a lawyer involved in the litigation of a matter 
may state without elaboration . . . the information 
contained in a public record."). Under these circumstances, 
we find no violation of the court's confidentiality order and 
no evidence of any misconduct. 
 
VI. 
 
For the foregoing reasons, we will vacate the District 
Court's sanction, and we direct that the District Court enter 
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an order unsealing all sealed bids and documents in the 
record if it has not already done so. 
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